

Globalization, Downsizing and Insecurity: Do We Need to Upgrade Marx's Theory of Alienation?

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Abstract

Earlier, this author investigated and found wanting popular claims that technical and social organizational changes associated with globalization have now greatly lessened alienation for factory workers in fully industrialized countries. Here he follows up his suggestion that any credible account of globalization must consider increased competition and employment insecurity and their effects upon alienation. Theoretically, decreased security could have made workers more concerned with having any employment at all and less with intrinsically interesting work over which they have control. Nevertheless, research on the 1930s and the current period of downsizing provides much more support for decreased security having further disempowered workers. Demands at work may well have increased more for managers and professionals, but they have also had greater resources for coping with such increased demands. While these new developments suggest that Marx's theory of alienation needs to be updated, they are consistent with its original thrusts.

Keywords

alienation, downsizing, globalization, job insecurity

Introduction

Earlier, this author (Archibald, 2009) investigated claims in a call for papers for the 2006 World Congress of Sociology in Durban, South Africa; claims that have in fact been popular. Because of globalization and related trends since the 1970s, the writer(s) suggested, alienation has now decreased among factory workers in the fully industrialized countries ('FICs') of the North and West regions of the globe, and increased among professionals, knowledge and other high-status service workers, to the point where earlier inequalities between these strata have now been reversed. Henceforth, this position will be referred to as 'Scenario One'.

In my review of recent literature I did find research indicating that continuous process technologies, a marked increase in the individual use of computers at work and 'high performance workplaces' (HPWs) with small teams and 'quality circles' can increase workers' objective control over work and therefore decrease their subjective alienation from it. However, such changes have seldom been widely and genuinely implemented and maintained. Indeed, they have often raised workers' expectations and aspirations as well as increased demands on them and their stress, and therefore increased rather than decreased their alienation. Similarly, while there has been some de-skilling and disempowering of service workers, service work still tends to be more skilled and autonomous than factory work, even when the latter entails continuous process technology, individual computers or HPWs. Furthermore, both factory and office work have been 'hollowed out' into 'good' versus 'bad' jobs. Neither has been subject to unilateral upgrading or de-skilling.

Although much of the literature reviewed either did not address subjective alienation from work at all or did so only by using job dissatisfaction as an indicator (the latter is confounded with other psychic states besides those Marx meant by alienation), recent surveys of American employees' 'engagement' in work and predictions of whether or not they would quit their current jobs if they won a \$10 million lottery indicate widespread and deep alienation. In fact, only 30% were engaged in 2002. Furthermore, low-status service and factory workers remain far more psychically alienated than the self-employed and managerial and professional employees.

Surely, any serious account of the effects of globalization must consider the possible effects of greatly increased intra- as well as inter-national competition among employees themselves as well as their employers. As a first step in this different direction from the Durban call for papers, I ended the earlier article with polling data indicating that

- a) Canadians and Americans have been very attuned to both downsizing and the general state of their economies in recent decades;
- b) their subjective employment and financial security have varied accordingly; and
- c) despite very low official levels of unemployment at this time of writing (the Fall of 2007), a majority of Americans still say it is 'a bad time to find a quality job'.

What I was not able to do in the earlier article was examine the validity of alternative potential relationships between employment or job insecurity and alienation. This is the main focus here. After evaluating the evidence for two such alternatives (Scenarios 'Two' and 'Three'), I then take up a paradoxical feature of occupational inequalities not directly addressed earlier. Specifically, demands at work have in fact often increased more for managers and professionals than for low-status service and factory workers. Yet, as noted above, the former are usually less rather than more psychically alienated from their work itself.

My own interpretation and use of Marx's theorizing about alienation are taken up in the earlier article and elsewhere (Archibald, 1978, 1989/93) and cannot be repeated in detail here. However, their main thrusts are as follows. First, alienation's empirical referents include both objective powerlessness and various subjective thoughts and feelings, especially withdrawing cognitively and emotionally from others and one's own labor, and approaching them narrowly for 'instrumental' or utilitarian purposes. Secondly, although

the latter are psychic responses to conflicts of interest and objective powerlessness, the relationship between the two sets of processes and states is usually curvilinear. Thus, moderate amounts of powerlessness are likely to first provoke individual attempts to find alternative employment and/or collective organization and attempts to regain power. Psychic alienation is then mainly a last resort against high degrees of powerlessness, when the other two responses are impossible or difficult. It entails a lowering of expectations and aspirations for control over intrinsically gratifying work, in order to lessen the severity of repeated deprivation and frustration.

Scenario Two (A): Has Subjective Alienation Indeed Decreased for Many Workers, but Only Because Insecurity Has Decreased the Importance of Work Quality?

This possibility is consistent with the importance Marx placed upon the hierarchical organization of humans' needs, whereby physical subsistence, sexual and social security needs take precedence over 'higher-order' ones for intrinsic involvement with, and considerable influence upon, others and one's work. If one can become preoccupied with, even 'fixated' upon, one's next meal, sexual coupling or insecure relationships with others more generally (Marx, 1976[1846]: 38–42, 255–6, 431–2), then perhaps one can also become so insecure about retaining any employment that the importance of having specifically autonomous and intrinsically interesting work greatly decreases, and therefore also one's attempts to further lower one's aspirations when confronted with disempowering, routine relationships and work. As opposed to such 'regression' with an increase in the importance of income and security about one's relationships and future employment, one should instead 'progress' up one's need hierarchy to aspire to relationships and work that are more intrinsically involving (Marx, 1975[1844]: 313).

There is already some evidence for this scenario. For example, within the state of Minnesota, several generations of job applicants with no direct experience of the insecurity of the 1930s were less likely than earlier generations to rank job security over interesting work (Jurgensen, 1978; see Hartley et al., 1991: 11). Similarly, a common finding in the 1950s and 1960s was that then much more secure white collar workers ranked interesting work over pay and job security, whereas manual/blue collars did the reverse. Furthermore, parallel differences have been found between workers in hitherto industrially developed (but now de-industrializing) versus hitherto underdeveloped (but now rapidly industrializing) countries (Inglehart and Oyserman, 2004).

I addressed these issues in my own research on retired workers in Hamilton, Ontario who first began to work for pay during the Great Depression of the 1930s (Archibald, 1992, 1996). There was a great deal of anecdotal evidence for insecurity, including one woman's claim that the most common greeting changed from 'How are you?' to 'Are you working?' Furthermore, most agreed that 'most workers' were 'too worried about where their next meal was coming from to complain or protest', and among those who were personally at least moderately deprived in general during the 1930s, twice as many put

up with depriving and frustrating work as overtly rebelled against it. Furthermore, many of these retirees were highly grateful to their employers for having any work at all, and some even chose low paying work in non-unionized 'sweatshops' over more interesting as well as highly paid and unionized work elsewhere, but which nevertheless was not very plentiful and secure.

Although at face value these results support Scenario Two (A)'s argument that insecurity undermines or overrides alienation, at least a plurality of retirees instead retained their aspirations for control and fulfilling work, expressed feelings of deprivation and frustration at not having achieved their aspirations, and simply waited until the labor market improved before unionizing and/or struggling for more control. When one adds this plurality to the minority of overt rebels, well over two-thirds of the deprived seem to have retained rather than lowered their aspirations for fulfilling work. They were not fixated upon merely surviving.

Milkman's (1997) findings for the early 1980s were similarly mixed. On one hand, at the beginning of her study most of her automobile assembly line workers were highly deprived and frustrated about their work, but when they were told that their plant was likely to close and then offered a substantial buyout package to leave voluntarily, only 22% of them accepted the offer. Milkman interpreted this to mean that the majority did not feel that they could get alternative employment, or at least as well paid and benefited employment, and therefore felt too insecure to take the buyout.

Most of those who did not take it both had higher seniority and were more likely to be women and African Americans who would have had more difficulty obtaining alternative employment at the same wages, whereas those who did take it had less seniority but were younger, more highly educated, and had more formal or informal, marketable skills. Nevertheless, most of the latter then usually became employed in non-unionized, lower paying and often equally insecure jobs. 'For *both* those who left and those who stayed at GM-Linden,' Milkman (1997: 12) stressed, 'the future is *extremely uncertain*, and *they* are *painfully aware* of this fact.' (Emphases added.)

On the other hand, despite the importance of security, Milkman herself (1997: 13, 109–10) stressed that

- a) the buyouts were almost as likely to cite the depriving, frustrating and alienating nature of their work as their insecurity as reasons for their choice; and
- b) few expressed regret about having left the factory, although it was still open at the time they were last interviewed. Furthermore,
- c) rather than come to feel less deprived and frustrated, the holdouts came to experience even more of these feelings. This appears to have occurred because management continued to violate promises they had made to the holdouts, who had in turn clearly continued to aspire to fulfilling work.

Hartley et al.'s (1991) study of job insecurity is also relevant here. In the first place, Dutch workers' overall feelings of job insecurity themselves were affected by how much they valued their job to begin with, rather than simply by how unlikely they believed

their chances were of retaining it. Those workers who did not value their current jobs a great deal experienced less severe job insecurity. These findings are consistent with those of Charles and James (2003) and Parry (2003): the less central paid work was to their workers' overall identity, and the less attractive they found their specific jobs and work, the less affected they were by the threat of losing them. Others have found that some workers actually experience relief and thrive when they become unemployed (Ezzy, 2001; Jahoda, 1982; Leff and Haft, 1983).

Whereas Milkman as well as Jahoda only imply it, Hartley et al. had predicted outright that even considerable insecurity is so little determining that individuals enter it into 'cost-benefit' analyses on a seemingly equal footing with deprivation and frustration from work itself. Does this mean we should reject Scenario Two (A) altogether? Perhaps we should, particularly since independent evidence for a need hierarchy is also mixed (see e.g. Archibald, 1989/93: 253–4).

However, it is possible that deprivation of even lower order needs has to be very severe and prolonged before fixation occurs, and that this has seldom occurred. Indeed, even in the 1930s, at least 70% of Hamiltonians remained employed, and as unemployment rose, the cost of living went down and public relief increased (Archibald, 1992). Similarly, in his review of studies by American sociologists during the 1930s themselves, Dubofsky (1986) argues that the vast majority of workers had relatively low aspirations; and often only for a few consumer goods; and that these were usually gratified and pacifying rather than deprived and provocative of rebellion. Given its higher order and greater uncertainty (one still has a job and may retain it), job insecurity may also be less preoccupying than the deprivation of needs such as hunger that are more directly related to subsistence.

Certainly, the continued insecurity of Milkman's buyouts despite their relief at having less alienating work questions the equivalency of complexity in and control over one's work with security. Similarly, whereas not valuing one's work and/or job in general did decrease the insecurity of their workers somewhat, in the end Hartley et al. (1991: 36–7, 76) acknowledged that the combination of the perceived likelihood of losing one's job, realistic feelings of powerlessness to do much about it and the vulnerability that arose from these, were far better predictors of overall feelings of job insecurity than cost-benefit analyses involving how much one valued one's job. Furthermore, the same was true for various 'safeguards' for retaining one's job, such as 'employees' influence upon decision-making', 'unions, seniority systems and employment contracts', and their 'locus of control'; that is, whether or not they believed they could influence their environment more generally.

When it came to predicting overt responses to job insecurity, Hartley et al. found that intentions to quit one's job correlated .19 with the perception that individual sources of insecurity were controllable, whereas loyalty toward one's employer and interest in one's work correlated $-.20$ with the expected success of collective action. Similarly, collective action was more likely when workers expected support from co-workers, family and friends; but loyalty and interest decreased with beliefs that the social causes of job insecurity were uncontrollable.

That alienation increased (that is, loyalty to one's employer and interest in one's work decreased) when workers believed they did not have much support from other workers

and that collective action was not likely to be successful is consistent with Marx's reasoning as outlined in the Introduction. An exception was Hartley et al.'s additional finding that individual exits, collective actions and psychic alienation often occurred together rather than remained mutually exclusive. This brings into question the Freudian-like, 'hydraulic' aspect of Marx's thinking: that energy that does not come out through one 'channel' must necessarily come out through another one. Nevertheless, this need not obviate its other thrusts.

But most important for evaluating Scenario Two (A) is Hartley et al.'s finding that job insecurity is much more likely to *increase* than decrease alienation from employers and work. A great deal of subsequent research replicates these findings for commitment and loyalty to employers and dissatisfaction with and intention to leave one's job (Chirumbolo and Hellgren, 2003; Sverke et al., 2002). In addition, longitudinal studies show that these relationships are causal rather than only correlational (Hellgren and Sverke, 2003; Hellgren et al., 1999).

Why, then, does job insecurity increase rather than decrease alienation? That it does, as well as the other responses to decreased power hypothesized by Marx, suggests that job insecurity is directly related to powerlessness, and may even overlap with it.

As it happens, Hartley et al. (1991: 41–5) and many others have relied heavily upon conceptions and measures of job insecurity developed by Greenleigh and Rosenblatt and Ashford and his colleagues that 'confound' a high perceived likelihood of losing one's job with feelings of powerlessness to prevent it and deal with its various consequences, including, as Lazarus and Folkman suggest, coping with one's own stress. However, as we have already seen, the latter appears to be both a major source of global feelings of job insecurity and more important than any mitigating feelings of anticipated relief from escaping alienating work.

As we shall see when we discuss Scenario Three, insecurity appears to increase workers' powerlessness and alienation in a variety of ways, indirectly as well as directly. However, for the moment it is worth considering the suggestions of a number of Scandinavian researchers: 'Job insecurity, by its uncertain nature, implies *unpredictability*. An uncertain future makes it difficult to foresee what will happen, and subsequently how to act on this. One does not know what – if anything – should be done. The other factor related to this is *uncontrollability* ... It is out of the employee's control whether he/she is allowed to keep the job or not. Previous research on stress illustrates that a recurring feeling of a lack of control is more detrimental to well-being than the more serious but rare incidents are, such as the actual loss of a job' (Sverke et al., 2004: 48; emphases added). If powerlessness is a consequence as well as source of insecurity, it is understandable that insecurity often increases rather than decreases psychic alienation.

Scenario Two (B): Has Downsizing Been Much Less Devastating Than Expected?

As I demonstrated in the earlier article, North American workers have been aware of downsizing over the last few decades, and their insecurity about their own jobs has varied

accordingly. However, social scientists may presume that employment insecurity has still not been widespread and intense, because downsizing has yet to directly affect a majority of workers. As Sparrow (2000) has shown, this reasoning is faulty, in that what most impresses those who have observed or heard about downsizing is not how many other workers have lost their employment because of it, but whether any downsizing at all has occurred. On the other hand, were social scientists to believe that the process of downsizing itself need not be and often has not been very traumatic for most survivors, they might still think that insecurity and alienation have remained low.

In fact, whereas some researchers maintain that downsizing has usually not only been unnecessary but has actually lessened firms' productivity as well as psychically devastated their surviving employees (Betcherman et al., 1994; Burke and Cooper, 2000: chapter 1; Sparrow, 2000), others with seemingly social Darwinist leanings (e.g. Noer, 2000) take a very different position. Thus, the 'old employment contract' (OEC) of the post-war compromise between capital and labor, whereby workers were assured of relatively high incomes and employment security in exchange for accepting technological and other changes that disempowered them, is no longer either viable or desired by the fittest workers, and most young people. Instead, continued employment must be based upon still more 'flexibility' for employers, with fewer of the earlier assurances for workers about employment. Nevertheless, employees who remain productive will keep their jobs, work will become more autonomous and challenging, and workers will be further empowered by the disappearance of unfit managers as well as co-workers.

Still others, probably a majority, take the middle position that downsizing is sometimes necessary but need not and will not always result in greatly increased insecurity and alienation and decreased productivity, if it is properly engineered. This has been the position of Brockner (1988: 215–18), a pioneer in research on downsizing.

Thus, anger is a common response to downsizing and will hurt survivors' productivity, and perhaps intentionally through sabotage. However, at the other extreme, relief will greatly increase productivity, presumably because workers who were highly insecure before downsizing will feel grateful toward their employers, and therefore obligated to reciprocate with increased loyalty. Meanwhile, initially low job insecurity could increase and distract or immobilize workers, or, as Hirschman (1970) had argued (see Sverke et al., 2005: 145–6), it may instead lead them to demonstrate more loyalty and conscientiousness, to ingratiate themselves with their employers and lessen the likelihood that they too will be laid off. In parallel fashion, rather than become angry, survivors who feel guilty may attempt to assuage their guilt and prove to themselves as well as their employers that they deserved to stay after all, by producing more, of better quality.

This reasoning then led to a number of suggestions for social engineering as well as Brockner's own research designs. The latter included experiments where job insecurity was held constantly low to investigate the effects of variations in the perceived 'equity' of the process as well as outcome of downsizing, and experiments and field studies where the effects of differences in perceived equity upon anger and the amount and quality of work were investigated. The former included suggestions to managers about how to conduct downsizing so as to mitigate many of the negative effects of insecurity and guilt.

For these purposes Brockner's early research was highly successful. Thus, survivors who believed that the process and outcome of downsizing were equitable appeared to experience less guilt, in that they were less likely to improve the amount and/or quality of their work, whereas those who were particularly close to and positive about the victims of downsizing appeared to experience more guilt, because their productivity did increase. On the other hand, aspects of his designs and results bring into question some of his own interpretations and explanations and raise the possibility that Marx's theorizing about alienation may be more useful.

In the first place, explicitly in the case of his 'equity' explanation for the alleged effects of guilt and implicitly in the case of his explanations for the negative effects of anger and positive effects of relief, Brockner had derived his predictions about the effects of downsizing from Homans's (1974) and Blau's (1964) 'Social Exchange Theory' (SET) and Adams's (1965) derivative 'Equity Theory' (ET). This has become the most popular theory about the effects of downsizing (Aryee et al., 2002; Ferres et al., 2005; Robinson, 1996; Travaglione and Cross, 2006).

For these organizational psychologists, applying SET to employer-employee relationships means conceiving them as 'social' as opposed to 'economic' exchanges, which entail qualitatively as well as quantitatively more, and more reciprocal, interpersonal commitment, loyalty and trust than one finds in narrowly economic exchange relationships. This often means more genuine cooperation and less competition and conflict, but exchangers' higher commitment and loyalty to and trust in each other can also mean much more anger, distrust and decreased commitment when one or the other side violates expectations and 'implicit' or even only one-way ('psychological') contracts.

Such a scenario might seem to contradict Marx. After all, his model was one of narrowly economic exchange relationships characterized by large inequalities and conflicts of interest, threat and distrust. Yet, the mature Marx (1973[1857]: 157, 589; undated [1867]: 96) noted that workers' employment contracts are often only implicit and employer-to-single-employee rather than collective. Even more tellingly, Marx (undated [1867]: 314; 1979[1852]) admitted that many workers erroneously believe that employers are capitalists only because they are natural leaders who deserve to lead, that aristocrats can be trusted to protect workers, and that the most important rights for workers and obligations for rulers are employment, equality of opportunity, and bourgeois civil liberties.

Similarly, most psychologists of downsizing have misunderstood or excised Blau's economic exchange-like qualifications. Blau (1964: 205–6) never intended SET to be an accurate portrayal of employer-employee relationships, because unlike the leaders of informal groups, managers are not elected by their employees, and employees' actions need not be, and often are not, voluntary. Furthermore, after first stating that trust is a requirement, Blau (1964: 94) then suggested instead that most social exchanges begin with few serious risks and little trust, and that trustworthiness must be demonstrated and earned. Although social exchangers then become less market-oriented and more interpersonally committed, they remain self-interested and use advantages in outside markets as leverage over their partners. This is Marx's (1975[1844]: 324–5) carrying one's means of influencing others (money) 'in one's pocket'.

Finally, one reciprocates others' favors not because one is moral, but because one wants others to continue to reward one (Blau, 1964: 92). Note too that Homans' (1974) 'distributive justice' is a decidedly bourgeois principle since, even in an informal group, one's deserts are just only when commensurate with one's prior investments.

These caveats are not meant to simply dismiss downsizing researchers' less cynical SETs. Whether most employer-employee exchange relationships are narrowly economic or more genuinely social should not be a matter of whose scripture is most ideologically satisfying, but actual empirical research on downsizing. However, before examining the latter it is important to note the theoretical importance of trust and distrust.

As with general job insecurity, distrust of employers is an aspect of insecurity with important implications for powerlessness and psychic alienation. Distrusting them likely means regarding

- a) what they say as *incredible*;
- b) what they do, and the relationship between what they say and what they do, as *unreliable*; and therefore also
- c) their thoughts, motives and actions as *unpredictable* and not open to influence from workers; and therefore in addition,
- d) a high likelihood that employers' actions will hurt the interests of workers (see Ferres et al., 2005: 79).

In other words, to distrust one's employer is likely to mean also feeling threatened and disempowered by him or her (Archibald, 1976). If this is true, as with job insecurity in general, decreases in trust and increases in distrust should increase psychic alienation. Nevertheless, if, on whatever basis, survivors of downsizing retain large amounts of trust in their employers, then psychic alienation may not increase much after all.

In this regard, most workers' trust in managers may never have been very high (Fox, 1974), and it certainly has been low over the last decade or so (Clemmer, 2005; Ferres et al., 2005: 79; Kramer, 1999: 569–98). Furthermore, even those who have continued to look for a silver lining in downsizing have had to admit that the latter decreases the trust of the vast majority of workers (Mishra et al., 1998: 84), that anger and other 'negative' (sic) emotions far outweigh 'positive' ones (Brockner et al., 2004; Kiefer, 2005; Noer, 1993; see Devine et al., 2003 for a review); and that on commitment, conscientiousness and other relevant dimensions, alienation has been much more likely to increase than decrease or remain the same (Brockner et al., 2004; Kiefer, 2005; Parker et al., 1997; Spreitzer and Mishra, 2002).

Clearly, some workers do trust their managers. Indeed, Hartley et al.'s Dutch workers were almost twice as likely to mention their direct supervisor as their union or works council as a safeguard against losing their jobs. Furthermore, correlations between trust in managers and job security were twice as high as those for the perceived strengths of unions and councils. Yet Dutch unions have been notoriously weak in the workplace, and that study was done before the massive downsizings of the 1990s.

In terms of *relative* deprivation, some survivors whose initial trust was high do appear to give their employers 'the benefit of the doubt' (Ferres et al., 2005). Also, when trust continues

it can moderate the effects of downsizing, directly, and indirectly through decreasing the likelihood that survivors will perceive contract violations and injustices that often intervene between downsizing and alienation (Ayree et al., 2002; Coyle-Shapiro, 2002; Ferres et al., 2005; Spreitzer and Mishra, 2002). Nevertheless, the evidence is mixed. For example, whereas within SET, commitment and loyalty have the same status as trust, as implied by the subtitle of their article ("The Higher They Are, the Harder They Fall"), Brockner, Tyler and Cooper-Schneider (1992) found that the most committed survivors felt the most betrayed by downsizing and experienced the largest increases in alienation.

Not surprisingly, job insecurity is highly likely to increase after downsizing, even if lay-offs have not been massive (Sparrow, 2000; Traviglione and Cross, 2006), although it need not, and apparently can also be lessened by social engineering (Burke and Cooper, 2000: chapter 1; Hellgren et al., 1999). Either way, there is little good evidence that when it does occur, it makes survivors more rather than less committed and conscientious, whether genuinely or otherwise. We have already seen this in the research on European workers more generally by Hartley et al (1991) and Sverke et al (2002), and the same appears to be true for North America (King, 2000).

There is little research on the job insecurity of those who have seen downsizings in their own workplaces, but Spreitzer and Mishra (2000) claim that in line with Hirschman and Brockner's early predictions, there were 'Hopefuls' and 'Obligers' as well as 'Fearfuls' and 'Cynics' among their Canadian survivors. On the other hand, they do not report relative proportions. The latter two types do overlap somewhat with Reid's (Royal Bank of Canada, 1997) 'Stressed Successes' and 'Anxious Cynics', but they constituted almost half of the general Canadian labor force (45%). Furthermore, of the 'Young and Restless', another 20% of Reid's sample who overlap with Spreitzer and Mishra's 'Hopefuls', 42% were not loyal, in that they had set a low maximum length of time to remain with their current employer. Therefore, a majority were probably insecure and/or alienated.

Either way, Sverke, Hellgren and Naswell (2005) conducted a direct test of the Obliging Loyalist hypothesis. They studied nurses in a Swedish health organization undergoing downsizing. Although absolute levels of subjective job insecurity were rather low among these nurses (they were still in high demand and a majority were unionized), there was much concern about the downsizing. Many protested about it by refusing to participate in decisions about it, and these and other forms of 'voice' were more frequent responses than 'exiting' the organization, albeit many nurses also tried to obtain more secure jobs within it. On the other hand, increasing loyalty and the intensity of one's work were still less frequent, and *job insecurity did not increase either loyalty or intensity*. In fact, as with previous research, insecurity *decreased* loyalty.

Brockner's Guilt/Restitution hypothesis has fared much better, and the mitigating effects of employers being and appearing just have been well supported. Thus, the harmful effects of downsizing have been lessened not only by perceived distributive and procedural justice (for example, workers were let go according to seniority), but by 'interactional' justice; that is, employers appeared to 'care' about and for victims, and better, also stressed survivors (Ferres et al., 2005; Kickul et al., 2002; Kiefer, 2005; Spreitzer and Mishra, 2002). Yet here too qualifications are in order.

First, as with survivors who are Obliging Loyalists only because they feel compelled to reduce their insecurity by ingratiating themselves with their employers and convincing themselves that they will not also be let go in the future, do the Guilty driven to reduce their guilt, by convincing themselves as well as their bosses that they deserved to keep their jobs after all, meet the criteria of voluntary, moral, 'social' exchangers?

Secondly, in his initial studies Brockner's (1988) strongest support for the hypothesis occurred when he deliberately kept survivors' job insecurity low, by assuring them that they would not also lose their jobs. However, when he let job insecurity rise, which it usually did, and conducted non-manipulative field studies, there was much less mitigation of the usual, decreased commitment to employers and work.

Thirdly, Brockner does not appear to have measured survivors' guilt directly, by asking them. As a consequence, greater justice may lessen anger more than guilt.

Fourthly, as Martin (1999) noted, in his early studies Brockner did not take into account the strong possibility that real-life survivors' workloads would increase dramatically after downsizing. Yet the latter occurred for emergency department nurses in Hamilton, who then experienced a great deal of injustice and anger, despite having regarded the process of downsizing itself as just. Increased workloads led them to see the existence of *any* layoffs as unfair and unjust, for their patients as well as themselves. As a consequence, their loyalty to their employer plummeted, and their involvement in their work itself probably would have as well, had they not had such strong professional ethics and care for their patients, and if their workloads had permitted it.

As well as others (Devine et al., 2003; Mishra et al., 1998; Parker et al., 1997; Spreitzer and Mishra, 2002), Brockner and his colleagues (2004) have now recognized and demonstrated the importance of workers' actual and perceived *control* over downsizing and its consequences. As one would expect from Marx's theory, even small-to-moderate amounts can decrease survivors' alienation, and this converse alienation effect may well be more important than increasing the reality and/or appearance of justice. These researchers have also shown that survivors' alienation is lower when they have a long term 'internal locus of control' and high self-esteem. That the more typical circumstance is little objective and subjective control over both the process and outcomes of downsizing, including increased workloads with little job redesign beneficial to workers themselves, suggests that, in addition to incorporating many of the results of downsizing predicted by SET, Marx's theory of alienation can explain others that the latter cannot. This is because, as Blau (1964) stressed, specifically social exchange presupposes a great deal of choice, which most survivors of downsizing may neither have nor experience.

The importance of control and choice is particularly evident in the study by Devine et al. (2003: 113–14). They compared survivors with 'victims' who had nevertheless found jobs with different employers. Survivors, they suggest, 'suffer because they feel stuck in a co-dependent relationship with an organization they no longer trust'. They '*feel they are at the mercy of their employer*, usually with few means available to ensure their job security'. Meanwhile, the reemployed downsized have already been, and experienced being, '*more in control of their employment future*'. (Emphases added.)

Survivors' decreased control is at the heart of Scenario Three. However, before proceeding there we should discuss relief, since whether it occurs among survivors and is followed by increased loyalty and conscientiousness are critical for evaluating SET. After all, if their employers have singled them out and rewarded them, that is, demonstrated a seemingly *interpersonal* commitment to *them*, as individuals, survivors should then feel not only relieved and grateful, but, given the norm of reciprocity, also *obligated* to become more loyal and conscientious. However, researchers have yet to demonstrate such widespread and 'deep' relief and gratitude; and most have acknowledged the preponderance of anger, distrust, job insecurity and guilt and their 'negative' effects on commitment to employers and work.

This is not to say that survivors never experience relief. This may have occurred particularly among workers who had felt the least loyal and most vulnerable before downsizing. However, as mentioned earlier, that anyone has been laid off is more likely to make survivors feel even more vulnerable than relieved, and/or with the passage of time, the above negative emotions may overshadow their initial relief. How much and how long survivors feel relief probably also depends upon whether their employers assure them of job security, and whether they do so publicly, which implies commitment.

Certainly, relief occurred among survivors in Hamilton during the 1930s, but it appears to have varied by the latter conditions. For example, one steel company (Stelco) introduced various welfare capitalist measures to undermine unions but then sabotaged workers' efforts to participate and improve conditions, and fired militants. Workers then became more distrustful and disloyal and struck. On the other hand, after destroying an early attempt at unionization, a second steel company (Dofasco) brought in 'guaranteed' employment and abided by it. There relief, gratitude, loyalty and conscientiousness were common. In a third company, Proctor and Gamble, explicit promises of full employment were briefly violated, but workers voiced their concerns, the company corrected the problem and apologized, and loyalty continued (Archibald, 2002).

Scenario Three: Insecurity Is Disempowering, Indirectly as well as Directly

As we have seen, insecurity in the form of distrust of employers and job insecurity more generally has been rampant, but the evidence overwhelmingly shows that it has been much more likely to increase than decrease or overshadow alienation from employers and work. We have already noted several plausible explanations for this.

First, feelings of job insecurity entail not being able to accurately predict whether one will actually lose one's employment, and perhaps also to understand the true sources of one's job insecurity. As a consequence, it is difficult to decide whether to exit or give voice, who or what to exit or give voice to, and how successful either is likely to be.

Secondly, most workers do not trust their employers, and those who have survived downsizings in their own work organizations are less likely than others to do so. Not trusting one's employer also means not being able to predict what they will do, and therefore not knowing how to influence them to provide more job security, or simply how to otherwise make the best of a bad situation.

A third, new possibility is that particularly when workers are not unionized or their unions are weak, the threat or actuality of downsizing is likely to increase competition among themselves, which will then increase distrust of each other, and make it more difficult to predict, influence and organize with each other. Marx (undated: 595–8) regarded this as particularly problematic during cyclical crises, in that workers would see themselves as competing to keep their own jobs with fellow workers at their own workplaces as well as the ‘reserve army of the unemployed’. This certainly occurred during the Great Depression (Archibald, 1992, 1996).

A fourth process has already been referred to: the prolonging and intensification of work. According to Marx, during crises employers will deliberately use competition and workers’ insecurity to make workers work longer and more intensely, and that same ‘atomization’ and insecurity will lessen the likelihood and success of their fighting back.

As we have already seen, powerlessness and a lack of control appear to be crucial for distrust and employment insecurity; inherently (the former overlap with, rather than are independent of, insecurity), and because they mediate the effects of insecurity upon alienation. For this reason, a closer examination of their nature and role is in order. As with Scenario Two (A), which proposed, inaccurately, that insecurity undermines or overshadows alienation, here too it is helpful to begin with Marx himself. In *Capital* (undated: 595–8) his clearest proposals about the effects of cyclical economic crises upon employment insecurity and powerlessness are as follows.

In general terms, ‘The industrial reserve army, during the periods of stagnation and average prosperity, weighs down the active labour-army; during the periods of over-production and paroxysm, *it holds its pretensions in check.*’ Presumably, this means that the still-employed either lower their aspirations for higher pay and more control, or/and do not act on them for this period. Recall that during the 1930s, the vast majority of Hamilton workers did these. Furthermore, the number of strikes was explained best by the number of unemployed applicants relative to the number of jobs posted in the local government employment bureau, rather than the level of unemployment *per se* (Archibald, 1992). Remember also that Milkman’s workers in the early 1980s and Hartley et al.’s in the early 1990s also appeared to have retained their aspirations. Therefore, we should probably stress the ‘checking’ over the lowering response. As for specifics, in that same passage Marx wrote that ‘the greater pressure that [the reserve] exerts on [the employed part of the working-class] *forces these to submit to over-work and to subjugation under the dictates of capital*’ (my emphases). Marx’s stress here seems to be on three processes.

For one thing, there is a decrease in workers’ power in general: employers can now control more aspects of workers’ working lives, and to a greater degree than usual. For another, workers will have less control over their work itself. Given Marx’s own stress on working time and workers’ attempts, some of them successful, to have it reduced, legally, he may have had in mind the expansion or *prolonging* of working time. This would also affect the balance between work and family life. The same is true for its *intensification*: having to work ‘harder’ mentally and/or physically, directly through being more closely supervised, or indirectly because of the introduction of new, or the speeding up of old,

machinery. This would lessen control over its pace, and perhaps also choice about how one does it. To the extent that work also becomes more repetitive, it would become less intrinsically interesting as well.

Finally, Marx implied that much of this decrease in power, control and intrinsic interest involves coercion or 'brute force': workers know that they must either submit or lose their employment to competitors. In this regard, many Hamilton retirees told this story about the 1930s: if one complained about anything related to one's employment or work, no matter how small, the boss would 'march' one over to a window and point out the hundreds of unemployed workers waiting to take one's place. In recent periods of high unemployment, or low overall official rates of unemployment but frequent downsizings and plant closings, coercion may have been more indirect, 'dulled' to the 'mere' awareness that other workers' jobs have been lost or directly threatened. Nevertheless, as we saw earlier, the latter has been widespread and worrying.

(a) The Prolonging and Intensification of Work

Numerous researchers have reported the prolonging and/or intensification of work, and 'work overload' and imbalances between work and non-work life, over the last few decades (Burchell, 2002; Duxbury and Higgins, 2003b: 6–7, undated: 4–5; Higgins and Duxbury, 2002: 8–10; Sverke et al., 2004: 13; Vezina et al., 2004). Gallie (2005: 355–7) is an exception. He claims that overall, neither objective nor subjective work pressure increased in the second half of the 1990s for workers in the European Union. However, European and North American economies were on upswings at this time, and Gallie himself suggests that in Europe workweeks were also being legally shortened in those years, and that this may have eased workers' feelings of pressure.

In general, the intensification of work itself within longstanding workweek lengths has probably been far more common than the lengthening of work time, even in North America. In this regard, Jacobs and Gerson (2004) report that the average length of Americans' workweeks has not changed much since the 1960s. On the other hand, they point out that substantial proportions of Americans are working far longer or far less than they prefer to. This implies considerable objective and subjective powerlessness and alienation, and workers' choices may have declined lately.

In their studies of the employees of large Canadian private, public and 'not-for-profit' workplaces (e.g. schools, hospitals and charities), Higgins and Duxbury (2002: 8–10) found that between 1991 and 2001, those saying they were working over 50 hours a week increased by 15%, whereas those working under 40 hours decreased by 21%. Also, 19% more were taking work home with them. Those employees who were experiencing 'high work overload' (too much work to handle comfortably) had increased by 12%. For 2001, Duxbury and Higgins emphasize (2003b: 6–7; undated: 4–5, my emphasis): '*Most* employees in our sample (58%) are currently experiencing high levels ... Another 30% report moderate levels.'

In both her review of past literature and the results of Burchell et al.'s large-scale studies of British workers during the 1990s, Wichert (2002) reports high correlations between

work intensification and job dissatisfaction on the one hand, and negative versus positive 'affect' more generally while working on the other. In addition to job dissatisfaction, Duxbury and Higgins (2003b: 7) found that work intensification decreased employees' commitment to their employer and increased both their absence from work and their thinking about and actual leaving for other employment. As noted earlier, the latter are good measures of psychic alienation.

These researchers also report that between 1991 and 2001, those who said they were highly committed to their employers decreased from 66% to 53%, and those who were highly satisfied with their jobs decreased from 62% to 46%. In other words, those alienated from their employers and their work had increased from about a third to a half.¹

Many of the researchers cited here explicitly refer to decreasing control over work as the intervening process that best explains the relationships between work prolongation and/or intensification on the one hand, and increased alienation on the other. European workers reported that 'they *had* to work at speed or to tight deadlines' (Burchell, 2002: 73, my emphasis). Between 1991 and 1996, those experiencing increased demands at work but lessened 'decision latitude' increased from 25% to 30%, and by 2000 '56% of workers reported working at a frantic pace, 60% had very tight deadlines for at least a quarter of the time, 35% reported complete lack of control over their task, and almost one third indicated no control over work methods or pace'. 'In the USA, between 1977 and 1997, the percentage of individuals having to "work very quickly" or "never having enough time to finish their work" rose from 55% to 68% and 40% to 60%, respectively.' In the province of Quebec, between 1992–3 and 1998, 'the percentage of workers with low latitude at work rose from 44% to 56%' (Vezina et al., 2004: 24).

In turn, researchers have suggested three processes that are likely to have decreased workers' control. One is very indirect, in that employers do not *order* workers to do more and more intense work. Here, downsizing has simply meant fewer workers have to do the same amount of work and finish it during the same amount of time (Brockner et al., 2004; Burchell, 2002: 76). Colorfully, Higgins and Duxbury (2002: 2–4, 10–11) refer to this as 'organizational anorexia', and point out the massive layoffs in Canada between 1991 and 2001, particularly in the public and not-for-profit sectors (see also Griffin Cohen, 1997). However, these researchers also emphasize that even in their large and officially non-capitalist work organizations, many employees did not have, and/or did not believe that they had, the *choice not* to accept more extensive and intense work, whether because of direct control by their employers, or simply because of rules and other structures in the employer's favor that employees could not or did not question effectively.

Thus, in 2001 only a third had 'flex time', and less than half could vary their working hours to accommodate their families or their own health, or interrupt their work day. Furthermore, less than half said their immediate manager was supportive of their non-work obligations (42.5%), and 40% said they could not refuse increased work time or speed. Less than half were unionized. Surprisingly, on the other hand, more than half (56%) reported that they were 'completely satisfied' with their job security. One can only imagine how much less choice the other, substantial minority of more insecure employees must have felt to refuse more and more intense work.

The importance of a combination of security and control is suggested by a study by Parker et al. (1997). Although their results appear to contradict the empirical generalization that work intensification increases alienation from employers and work, according to Isaksson et al. (2005: 99–100), the more typical outcomes were probably mitigated mainly because “The study ... was performed in a situation where the personnel concerned had a relatively secure future.” This is a very reasonable interpretation. After all, while the reductions of employees at this British continuous process chemical factory complex amounted to about 40%, they were made only gradually, over four years, and only 5% of them were compulsory. However, the results with regard to intensification and alienation were not so contradictory to begin with.

For one thing, as Parker et al. (1997: 290, 300) themselves stress, theirs was one of those rare cases referred to in the literature on the ‘HPW’, where in addition to maintaining job security, management genuinely redesigned jobs to provide more responsibility and stimulation, and sought and accepted workers’ participation. Furthermore, whereas increases in responsibility, control and participation led to increases in job satisfaction and decreases in absences, the former change, at least, occurred only among process operators, who presumably would have had the least responsibility, control and participation at the start. Moreover, there was an interaction between increases in demand and control only among those whose demands and control were low to begin with, whom one again supposes were the process workers. For others whose demands (and control?) were already at high levels, increased demands (intensification) *did* lead to decreased job satisfaction (increased alienation).

Yet a third set of constraints upon workers is the uncertainty in their environment and their own distrust and employment insecurity, together and separately. As noted earlier, when one’s employers and events in one’s environment are unpredictable, it is not clear how one should interpret and respond to them, and whether one will be able to cope with prolonged stress. Although the latter is likely to vary by the amount of social support available, if one distrusts one’s employers one may not seek it from them even if it would be there for the asking, and insecurity may increase competition with fellow workers and decrease support from them. These too are likely to increase feelings of powerlessness.

(b) Revisiting the Stratification of Alienation

Scenario One, the Durban rationale, included the claim that globalization since the 1970s has not just decreased alienation in FICs in general, but substantially redistributed it from factory to office workers. Although no evidence for this claim was offered, nor, to my knowledge, is any readily available, there is good reason to suspect that the alienation of office workers has indeed increased of late. After all, in Europe as well as North America in the 1980s and 1990s, the unemployment rates of white collar workers increased faster than those for manual workers (Burchell, 2002; Hanisch, 1999), which means that feelings of distrust and job insecurity probably did as well, and we know that the latter increase alienation. Furthermore, ‘organizational anorexia’ should increase, and

in fact often has increased the workloads of managers who have survived downsizing, in the form of increased 'spans of control' (the numbers of workers under them whom they have had to supervise, and perhaps also do the work of).

Nevertheless, in Karasek and Theorell's (1990) Demand/Support/Control model, employees who have much social support and control over their work itself should be able to handle the prolonging and intensification of work much better than others. Duxbury and Higgins (2003b: 10–11) add the 'wrinkle' that those with challenging work will be more intrinsically involved in it (that is, less alienated), and that this too is likely to make more and more intense work more palatable and less stressful.

Karasek and Theorell (1990) themselves had little to say about distrust and job insecurity, but they would probably consider them to also be 'stressors'. Yet,

- a) one might expect control over and interest in one's work to also increase one's capacity to cope with increased insecurity, and
- b) if high-status office workers remain more secure than factory workers despite rates of unemployment and insecurity that have been increasing faster, then they should remain less, rather than have become more, alienated.

Alternatively, Karasek and Theorell can be interpreted as predicting that high-status employees will be more likely to experience increased workloads, and that because of this, even their normally better capacity for coping with stress will be exceeded. This might seem consistent with the Durban rationale. On the other hand, rather than, in effect, alienation (avoidance of and/or indifference towards work itself), Karasek and Theorell then predict mental as well as physical exhaustion ('burnout') and illness.

Since Duxbury and Higgins (2003b: 6–7) only hint that their own results follow some of these lines of reasoning, without pointing to specific empirical support, I have reorganized their aggregate findings for a more direct test. I first selected only those items that seem most relevant to insecurity and Karasek and Theorell's model. I then did a balance sheet of advantages and disadvantages for their two categories/strata of occupations: Professionals and Managers ('Man-Prof's') and non-professionals and non-managers ('Non-Man-Prof's'). Table 1 reports only the summary scores for financial and job security, demands, controls and alienation.²

A plus sign means professionals and managers were relatively advantaged on the item in question; a negative sign means they were disadvantaged and non-professionals were advantaged. Plus and minus amounts were then added for each variable, to see whether overall, one or the other occupational cluster was favored.

The first finding was that professionals and managers ('Man-Prof's') were considerably more secure about their employment. They were 25% less likely to say that money was tight or an issue in their lives, and 14% more said they were satisfied with the security of their jobs. Given the aforementioned, substantial, *positive* relationship between job insecurity and alienation, this finding of a 39% advantage in security is critical. As noted earlier by Hanisch (1999) and Burchell (2002), it also contradicts the frequent claim that members of high status occupations are now much less secure.

Table 1 Stress and Alienation by Occupational Stratum*

	Man-Profes	Non-Man-Profes	Difference
Insecurity:			
Money Tight	19%	31%	+12%
Not an Issue	37	24	+13
High Satisfaction with Job Security	63	49	+14
Total Difference for Insecurity			+39%
Total Demands re: Work:			-65.4%
Total Controls re: Work:			+22%
Overload, Strain, Stress:			-18%
Alienation re: Employer:			
Organization > average	50	47	+3
Committed to	54	51	+3
Alienation re: Work:			
General Job Satisfaction	70	63	+7
Meet Career Goals	42	35	+7
Absences	67	66	-1
Intent to Leave	28	26	-2
Total Difference Alienation			+17

Source: Linda Duxbury and Chris Higgins (2003a) Where to Work in Canada? An Examination of Regional Differences in Work Life Practices. Appendices A and B.

However, Man-Profes did have many more demands upon them. On average, their weekly and unpaid overtime hours were much longer, and they were also much more likely to take work home with them. The total 'score' against this stratum was high here: - 65.4. When it came to resources or 'control' to deal with demands, Man-Profes were also disadvantaged on a number of items. Most notably, they were much more likely to say that long hours were necessary for them if they wanted to advance their careers, and 14% fewer of them were unionized. On the other hand, when one adds in conditions like being able to vary one's work hours, choose shifts or take time off to care for one's family, the overall control score was actually +22 in *favor* of Man-Profes.

With regard to frustrations and stress about the job itself and its interference with one's family life, those in the higher stratum were again highly disadvantaged, with a difference of -17 on work itself and -20 for its effects on family. This disadvantage was almost cut in half by overall well-being: Man-Profes were 8% more satisfied with their lives in general and 8% less likely to say they tended to be highly depressed. On balance they were indeed *more* likely to be *stressed* at and about their work, as Karasek claims. Yet, as he also implied, Man-Profes were *less alienated* from their employers and their work. They were considerably more satisfied with their work in general, and with it as a vehicle to meet their career goals; that is, to contribute to their personal fulfillment. This was so despite their having been substantially more dissatisfied with scheduling and their workload in particular. Furthermore, they were only very slightly more prone to be absent or to intend to leave their employer.

Therefore, claims that globalization has now reversed status differences in alienation are simply false. Clearly, we should pay more attention to the increasing deprivation, frustration and alienation of high-status service and knowledge workers, but factory and low-status service workers continue to be more powerless and alienated.

Summary and Conclusions

In my first article for this journal (Archibald, 2009) I reviewed and reanalyzed previous research findings relevant to popular claims that globalization has now greatly reduced work alienation among factory workers in the fully industrialized countries of the world, while increasing it among high-status service and knowledge employees there to the point where earlier inequalities in favor of owners, managers and high-status service employees have now been reversed. However, work alienation clearly remains high among a large majority of factory workers in North America, and much higher than among other classes and strata. Some of the technical and social organizational changes that presumably inspired such claims – that is, automation, the personal use of computers, and HPWs for factory workers and de-skilling and increased workloads for high-status service workers – may have had the predicted effects for some, but they have been too infrequent, uneven or/and subverted by opposing trends to have unilaterally improved or deteriorated control over intrinsically interesting work, respectively, for a majority of either category of employees.

In the present article I have investigated alternative scenarios for the effects of different trends which may be more directly associated with globalization than the ones just discussed. They are greatly increased inter- and intra-national competition and employment insecurity. While it is theoretically possible that increased concern with any employment has decreased expectations and aspirations for high quality and low alienating work, and therefore psychic alienation – Scenario Two (A) – there is not much support for this either. Nor can one make a strong case that downsizing has been much less devastating for survivors than one might think – Scenario Two (B). Although it is true that downsizing that appears relatively just and allows workers to retain some degree of control over it and its consequences lessens survivors' personal devastation, these conditions too have been too infrequent, superficial or short-lived to obviate alienation for the majority. Furthermore, job insecurity often continues and undermines the advantages of perceived justice and control.

The position that receives by far the best support (Scenario Three) is that globalization and competition have increased distrust of owners and managers and job insecurity more generally, which have then made it difficult to predict and influence both one's employers and fellow workers, and thereby increased objective powerlessness and subjective alienation. The latter occur both directly from insecurity itself and indirectly by making it difficult for workers to organize and fight back effectively. These processes clearly apply to many high-status managers and service employees as well as factory workers, but for reasons consistent with Karasek's Demand and Control model, the former are still highly privileged with regard to alienation from work itself.

Although all of these processes – those in Scenarios Two (A) and (B) as well as Three – are consistent with Marx's original theory of alienation, some of them were not foreseen or developed by Marx himself. It may therefore make sense to further explore and borrow from additional theories that deal with micro-interaction, insecurity and stress. Two candidates discussed in this article are Social Exchange Theory and Karasek's model. Two others are Goffman's strand of interactionism (see e.g. Archibald, 1976) and theories of anomie and aversion to risk (e.g. Hagan et al., 1985).

However, if Marxists are to update Marx's theory of alienation and defend it from its critics they will first have to read Marx more widely and deeply, and recognize the great importance of social psychological reasoning for his overall theorizing, and his own commitment to systematic empirical research. They will then have to read empirical research by others, including psychologists in hitherto unlikely places such as schools of business, and directly address their research methods and findings, rather than simply ignore or dismiss them as irrelevant for Marx's theorizing.

As I hope I have demonstrated in this and the previous article, both the findings and interpretations of non-Marxist, non-sociologists can be a great resource for Marxists. After all, many of them have not only large research grants, samples of workers and sets of data which many of us would have great difficulty obtaining, but highly progressive interpretations and much sympathy for the victims of global capitalism and downsizing. As one leftist organizer put it, with regard to progressive social movements more generally, 'If it moves, follow it!'

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Notes

- 1 Response rates to Duxbury and Higgins's survey questionnaires from individual employees within particular organizations were often low, but these researchers did sample 100 work organizations with over 500 employees, and they obtained information from 28,538 individual employees. Professionals and managers constituted about half of them.
- 2 I did not have their raw data, and hence could not correlate individuals' job insecurity with their alienation from their employers and their work. Rather, I had only aggregate percentages for the variables of interest to us here, separately, and had to infer correlations and causal relationships from such aggregates. Furthermore, whereas for the earlier mentioned changes from 1991 to 2001, we can at least use the many and large downsizings between these two years to make inferences about causality, these differences between occupational strata are only cross-sectional. Yet, they are consistent with Karasek's model.

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